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Abstract—Current commercial anti-malware products fail
to guarantee a 100% detection and prevention of malware.
This paper proposes an evaluation framework called ATE
(Anti-malware Technique Evaluator) that can be used to
evaluate commercial anti-malware products. ATE identifies the
vulnerabilities in anti-malware products by providing a set of
requirements that must be fulfilled by the anti-malware product
being evaluated. The ATE requirements used for evaluating
anti-malware products go beyond the usual false positives, false
negative, performance etc requirements employed by current
anti-malware product evaluations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The commercial products available to detect and prevent
malware make use of one or both of the following approaches:
Signature based detection and heuristic based detection [1].
Looking at the statistics in [2] we can see that although
malware detection techniques are detecting and preventing
malware, they do not guarantee a 100% detection and or
prevention of malware. In order to better understand and / or
determine why anti-malware products are not working we have
created a framework called ATE (Anti-malware Technique
Evaluator). We use ATE to evaluate current commercial anti-
malware products used by the home user.
The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows:
sections II-VI will discuss our ATE framework, section VII
will provide the justification for ATE’s layer weights, section
VIII will briefly discuss the results of an ATE evaluation and
lastly section IX will provide the conclusion and future work.
II. OVERVIEW OF ATE (ANTI-MALWARE TECHNIQUE
EVALUATOR)
Our ATE framework consists of four layers namely the User
Layer, Dependability Layer, Accuracy Layer and the Easily
Go Undetected (EGU) Layer. To evaluate a commercial anti-
malware product X, the product X is evaluated against each
of the four layers of ATE. Each layer of ATE consists of a
number of components and each component has a number of
requirements that an anti-malware product being evaluated is
measured against. The requirements of the components each
have a different score associated with them. The score for a
requirement is awarded to an anti-malware product when it
fulfills that specific requirement. The requirement scores of a
respective component collectively add up to a total possible
score of 100. The requirement scores are used to calculate that
component’s respective Component Score (CS).
The CS is calculated by adding up the scores attained
by the anti-malware product for the requirements in that
requirement’s respective component and multiplying the result
by the component’s weight. The weights of each component
in a layer add up to 1. Each layer also has a weight associated
with it and all the layer weights add up to 1. The Layer
Scores (LSs) are calculated by adding up all the component
scores of the respective layer and multiplying the result with
the respective layer’s weight. The four layer scores are then
summed up to give us a final score out of 100 for the anti-
malware product being evaluated. A commercial anti-malware
product is evaluated against each of the four layers of ATE by
checking which requirements the anti-malware product fulfills
in the respective ATE layer. We will discuss the User Layer
of our ATE framework next.
III. USER LAYER
The User Layer deals specifically with aspects regarding the
user of the anti-malware product. As illustrated in Fig.1, we
look at two components in this layer namely the Susceptibility
to Social Engineering and the Susceptibility to Human Error
components. Each of these components contain 2 require-
ments. It should be noted that the social engineering and
human error components of the User Layer are not usually
considered as being a part of anti-malware product evaluations.
This can be seen in the evaluations performed by organisations
such as AV-TEST [3] and AV-Comparatives [4]. Furthermore
from our literature study and research over the past 2 years
we found no other evaluation framework and / or method that
considers human error and social engineering as part of the
anti-malware product evaluation.
This layer consists of two component scores namely CS1
and CS2. The weights for both components are 0.5. We
will now discuss each component in turn starting with the
Susceptibility to Social Engineering component.
A. Susceptibility to Social Engineering
This is a very important component to consider with
regards to how effective an anti-malware product is. The
reason for this is that the user in most cases is the one
who decides whether or not they want to execute a file be
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it malicious or not. This may be due to the user believing
that the program is useful or that it comes from a trusted
source. The report in [2] identifies social engineering as the
preferred method to spread malware. Although many users
are aware of social engineering attacks by means of e-mail
[2], the majority of users are unaware of the dangers of
executing files from unknown sources. The two requirements
of this component are listed in Fig.1 and focus specifically
on reducing the chances of a social engineering attack being
successful. The two requirements of this component will be
discussed next.
1) Susceptibility to Social Engineering Requirements: An
anti-malware product will fulfill the first requirement if, when
it runs for the first time after installation, it informs the user
about the different types of social engineering attacks. An anti-
malware product will fulfill the second requirement if it main-
tains an up to date database with information regarding social
engineering attacks. The database must be easily accessible to
the user of the anti-malware product. The next section will
discuss the second component of the User Layer namely the
Susceptibility to Human Error component.
B. Susceptibility to Human Error
Human error and lack of understanding play a role in the
effectiveness of the anti-malware product. This is because
the user may choose to disable a feature provided by
the anti-malware product due to failing to understand the
feature or because the feature affects the performance of
the computer. A user may also decide to ignore a program
once it has been detected as being malicious because of fear
or lack of knowledge of which action should be taken [5].
This could result in the PC being infected with malware.
The two requirements of this component are listed in Fig.1
and focus specifically on reducing the chances of a human
error occuring. Additional information regarding the two
requirements will be given next.
1) Susceptibility to Human Error Requirements: The anti-
malware product will fulfill the first requirement if it provides
a warning message when a user attempts to disable one of its
critical functions. The warning message must contain an expla-
nation of what the function provides and the consequences of
disabling the function in order to encourage the user to leave
the function on. The explanation should be easily understood
by all users.
In order to fulfill the second requirement, the anti-malware
product must strongly advise the user not to ignore a program
that has been identified as being malicious unless they are
a 100% sure. The anti-malware product must display a per-
centage regarding the certainty that the file is malicious. This
will help the user in making the correct decision. It should be
noted that the anti-malware product will be considered as not
meeting requirement 2 should it not allow the user to mark a
program as not being malicious. The prior is important because
anti-malware products can have false positives. A false positive
could result in more problems should the anti-malware product
not allow the user to mark a program as not being malicious.
We have now discussed the two components of our User Layer
that is part of our ATE framework. The next section will
provide the justification for the chosen requirement scores as
well as the chosen weights of the components i.e. how these
components will be scored.
C. Justification for chosen requirement scores and component
weights
The User Layer of ATE deals specifically with human error
as well as social engineering. Both of these components are
closely related as social engineering in some aspects relies on
there being a human error in judgment whereas human error
can also be brought about due to social engineering. Therefore
each component score, namely CS1 and CS2, are given an
equal weight of 0.5. The requirements in each component are
also of equal importance and have hence been given a score of
50 each. This is due to the fact that should one requirement
not be fulfilled a human error or social engineering attack
may occur and / or be exploited. This concludes the discussion
about the User Layer of our ATE framework. The next section
will discuss the Dependability Layer of our ATE framework.
IV. DEPENDABILITY LAYER
This layer looks at any dependency that the anti-malware
product might have on some or other resource in order to work
correctly. As illustrated in Fig.2, we look at one component
in this layer namely the Dependency on the Operating System
(OS) to provide information component. The component only
contains 1 requirement. This layer consists of one component
score denoted as CS1. The weight for the component is
therefore 1.
Lastly it should be noted that the Dependability Layer
checks for a requirement which is not usually considered
or taken into account when organisations such as AV-TEST
[3] and AV-Comparatives [4] perform anti-malware product
evaluations. Furthermore according to our knowledge and from
our extensive literature study no other framework or method
exists that evaluates anti-malware products by checking for
such requirements. The next section will discuss the only
component of this layer, namely the Dependency on Operating
System to Provide Information component.
A. Dependency on Operating System to Provide Information
In order for an anti-malware product to perform a scan
and / or to monitor for malware it requires certain data such
as the list of processes currently running, the list of files in
directories, access to memory etc. This data is provided by
the OS through application programming interfaces (APIs).
However as can be seen in [6] this data cannot always be
trusted due to the existence of malware but more specifically
rootkits that can change the data being requested in order for
the malware to hide itself or other malware. Furthermore this
component was included as a result of our work done in [7],
where we found that should a rootkit compromise a system
you cannot trust the OS. The requirement of this component
is listed in Fig 2. Additional information for the requirement
will be given next.
1) Dependency on Operating System to Provide Information
Requirement: Our Evader Rootkit prototype from our previous
work in [7] will be used to check this requirement by hiding
files on disk from the anti-malware product while it performs
a scan. The next section will provide the justification for the
chosen requirement scores and component weights.
B. Justification for chosen scores and weights
The Dependability Layer contains only one component
which has only one requirement. Therefore the chosen score
for the requirement was a 100 and the chosen weight for the
component was 1.
This concludes the discussion about the Dependability
Layer of our ATE framework. The next section will discuss
the Accuracy Layer of our ATE framework.
V. ACCURACY LAYER
The Accuracy Layer is used to evaluate the anti-malware
product’s accuracy. As illustrated in Fig.3 there is only one
component in this layer namely the Accuracy component
which has three requirements. This layer consists of one com-
ponent score denoted as CS1. The weight for the component
is therefore 1. We will now discuss the Accuracy component
in more detail.
A. Accuracy
An anti-malware product should not produce any false
positives or false negatives. This is becoming more challenging
to do because malware authors started using techniques to
generate metamorphic or polymorphic malware [8]. In order
to deal with this problem, heuristic based techniques allow a
user to control the sensitivity of the technique by adjusting
a detection threshold. However raising the sensitivity could
cause benign programs to be detected as malicious, which
is an example of a false positive. Lowering the sensitivity
could result in malicious programs not being detected which
is an example of a false negative. The requirements of this
component are listed in Fig.3. Additional information (not
shown in Fig.3) for the requirements will be given next.
1) Accuracy Requirements: For the first requirement, false
negatives can be checked by making use of malware collec-
tions such as those provided by VX Heavens [9] and Offensive
Computing [10]. Should the anti-malware product fail to detect
any of the samples used then a false negative would have
occurred.
Checking the second requirement is important because a
high amount of false positives will result in a user loosing
faith in the product and / or stop using it [11]. False positives
are checked by scanning benign samples. If any file is detected
as being malicious then a false positive would have occurred.
This may seem to be an overly strict requirement, however the
reader needs to keep in mind that the goal of ATE is to identify
why commercial anti-malware products are not working. The
prior is achieved by identifying the vulnerabilities that exist
in the products. One such vulnerability is the possibility of a
false positive occuring i.e. a single false positive could result
in significant damage occuring, therefore an anti-malware
product should stive to achieve such a requirement.
The third requirement differs from the requirements of the
Susceptibility to Human Error component because in this case
the anti-malware product is not allowing the user to disable a
critical function but it is instead allowing the user to reduce
its accuracy and / or effectiveness. To fulfill this requirement
the anti-malware product must warn the user of the dangers
of lowering or increasing the accuracy of the anti-malware
product. Furthermore help should be available to assist the
user in choosing the best setting for him/her.
We have now discussed the Accuracy component of our
Accuracy Layer that is part of our ATE framework. The
next section will provide the justification for the chosen
requirement scores and component weights.
B. Justification for chosen scores and weight
The requirements regarding false negatives and false pos-
itives, requirements 1 and 2 respectively can be initially
considered as contributing a score of 25 each and a combined
score of 50 for the Accuracy Layer. The reason for this is that
a user will loose faith in a product should a false positive or
false negative occur. However looking at the detection rates
and false positive results of anti-malware products evaluated
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in [12], we can see that the average detection rate of the anti-
malware products evaluated in [12] is 96%. This indicates that
on average 4% of the scanned malware resulted in false nega-
tives. Also the average percentage of false positives was 19%.
Therefore the difference in percentage between 4% of false
negatives and 19% of false positives is 15%. This indicates
that false positives are 15% higher than false negatives which
makes false positives more of a greater concern than false
negatives. Therefore the initial scores assigned were adjusted
as follows: the false negatives requirement from 25 to 10 and
the false positives requirement score from 25 to 40.
The remaining score of 50 is assigned to the third re-
quirement i.e. warning the user when the accuracy of the
anti-malware product is changed. This is important because
should a user lower the accuracy then false negatives would
occur whereas raising the accuracy could result in more false
positives. Lastly the chosen component weight was 1 because
there is only one component in this layer. The next section
will discuss the last layer of our ATE framework namely the
EGU (Easily Go Undetected) Layer.
VI. EGU (EASILY GO UNDETECTED) LAYER
We have introduced this layer to address the toughest
problems faced by anti-malware products namely zero day
malware, privilege level escalation, rootkits, metamorphic and
polymorphic malware [1], [13]. It should be noted, as in the
case of the User Layer and Dependability Layer, that the
EGU Layer checks for requirements which are not usually
considered or taken into account when organisations such as
AV-TEST [3] and AV-Comparatives [4] perform anti-malware
product evaluations. Furthermore according to our knowledge
and from our extensive literature study no other framework
or method exists that evaluates anti-malware products by
checking for such requirements.
The EGU Layer makes use of two rootkits that we devel-
oped in our previous work [7] to check for the requirements of
this layer. In our previous work we named the two rootkits The
Sabotager and The Evader respectively. Recall that our Evader
rootkit is also used to check a requirement of the Dependability
Layer. We will provide a brief summary of our rootkits in the
next section.
A. The Sabotager and The Evader Rootkits
1) The Sabotager Rootkit: The Sabotager Rootkit can
successfully sabotage 32 bit Windows XP or 32 bit Windows
7 OS by preventing it from booting. It also deletes previous
restore points created by Microsoft’s System Restore utility
and creates a restore point after its installation is complete.
This ensures that the user will not be able to easily recover
from the bug check (blue screen) causing the computer not to
boot. We have packaged the rootkit as an installer for a game.
During the installation a message is displayed notifying the
user that the installation failed. The message also displays a
link to some site where the user is lead to believe they can
get help on the error but which could instead be a malicious
site.
2) The Evader Rootkit: The Evader Rootkit, as with The
Sabotager Rootkit, makes use of social engineering in order to
be installed i.e. it is packaged as an installer for a game. The
main goal of The Evader rootkit is to disable any anti-malware
products running on the computer. The Evader Rootkit also
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logs any key pressed and stores them in a text file. The Evader
rootkit is also able to hide any file on disk. This concludes the
discussion of our two rootkits used in the EGU Layer. We will
now discuss each component of the EGU Layer (see Fig.4) in
turn starting with the Detects Zero Day Malware component.
B. Detects Zero Day Malware
The previous section briefly discussed the rootkits we
developed in our previous work in [7]. The rootkits were
developed in order to assist us in the evaluation of the
requirements for the EGU Layer. This section will discuss the
first component of our EGU Layer that addresses zero day
malware. Zero day malware refers to an unknown malware
instance that has been released into the wild. Signature based
techniques are significantly impacted by zero day malware
because they require the signature of the malware instance
in order to be able to detect it [13]. A signature however
is only extracted after a large amount of computers have
been infected by the malware. Other techniques such as the
heuristic based techniques are also unable to deal with all
zero day malware. The two requirements of this component
are listed in Fig.4 and discussed next.
1) Detects Zero Day Malware Requirements.: The Sabo-
tager and The Evader rootkits are currently not wide spread
and no specific signature exists for them. Therefore according
to the definition of zero-day malware the Sabotager and Evader
rootkits are zero-day malware. Therefore in order for an anti-
malware product to fulfill the first and second requirement it
must be able to detect the Sabotager rootkit and Evader rootkit
respectively. The next section will discuss the Subversion by
Means of Higher Privilege Levels component of the EGU
layer.
C. Subversion by Means of Higher Privilege Levels
User mode applications cannot perform any instruction
directly that affects the control of the machine or does
Input/Output, for example reading hard drives. All such
instructions must go through the OS [14]. The only other
software that is allowed to run in kernel mode are device
drivers, also known as kernel-mode drivers. Kernel-mode
drivers have the same privileges as the OS itself i.e. they
can do anything the OS can do [6], [14]. This means that
malware that makes use of a kernel-mode driver has the same
privileges as the OS allowing it essentially to do whatever the
OS can do. This includes but is not limited to: hiding itself
by manipulating the list of running processes, concealing
files on a hard drive etc [6]. Our Evader Rootkit runs as
a kernel-mode driver and therefore has such capabilities.
Particularly it can disable anti-malware products and hide files
on disk. Therefore the Evader rootkit is used to test for the
requirement of this component. It should also be noted that
anti-malware products also make use of kernel-mode drivers
to scan for malware [6]. The requirement of this component
is listed in Fig.4 and additional information regarding the
requirement is provided next.
1) Subversion by Means of Higher Privilege Levels Re-
quirement: Our Evader Rootkit will attempt to disable the anti-
malware product. If the anti-malware product is not disabled
by our Evader rootkit then it will have fulfilled the require-
ment. The next section will discuss the Handles Obfuscation
component of the EGU layer.
D. Handles Obfuscation
Malware authors have started to resort to sophisticated
hiding techniques based on code obfuscation [13]. Code
obfuscation is the process of applying semantic preserving
transformations to a program such that it becomes unintel-
ligible but still maintains similar behaviour [15]. Therefore
malware authors can change the malware such that it results in
a different signature being produced but leaves the semantics
or rather the malicious behaviour of the malware the same.
There are many different ways to obfuscate code as highlighted
in [13].
Metamorphic malware makes use of code obfuscation in
order to change its code structure in such a way that very little
bytes remain that can be used as a signature [8]. Polymorphic
malware encrypts its payload using different keys each time
to make it undetectable. Polymorphic malware however
can be identified by the signature of its decryptor [8]. The
polymorphic malware therefore makes use of metamorphic
decryptors to avoid such detection. The requirement of this
component is listed in Fig.4 and additional information
regarding the requirement is provided next.
1) Handles Obfuscation Requirement: In order to check for
the requirement of this component we obfuscated a malware
instance using PEScrambler, which is a tool that is used to ob-
fuscate Win32 binaries automatically [16]. The anti-malware
product fulfills the requirement if it successfully detects the
obfuscated malware instance. We have now discussed the EGU
Layer. The next section will provide the justification for the
chosen requirement scores and component weights.
E. Justification for chosen scores and weights
The EGU Layer consists of three components. The Handles
Obfuscation component only has one requirement and as such
it is given a score of 100. The Detects Zero Day Malware
component has two requirements of which one addresses the
detection of the Evader rootkit and the other the detection of
the Sabotager rootkit. It was decided to give each requirement
a score of 50 each because both rootkits are equally repre-
sentative of zero day malware. The Subversion by Means of
Higher Privilege levels component only has one requirement
and as such it is given a score of 100.
The Subversion by Means of Higher Privilege levels compo-
nent was given a component weight of 0.6 and the remaining
two components, namely the Detects Zero Day Malware com-
ponent and the Handles Obfuscation component, were given
a component weight of 0.2 each. The rationale for this is that
anti-malware products are already extensively tested for being
able to detect zero day malware and handling obfuscation.
Lastly it is more important to ensure that the anti-malware
product cannot be disabled because if it can then being able
to handle obfuscation and detect zero day malware is a mute
point i.e. irrelevant. We have now looked at all the layers of our
ATE framework. The next section will discuss the allocation
of the layer weights.
VII. JUSTIFICATION OF THE LAYER WEIGHTS
The following weights were assigned to each layer:
1) User Layer a weight of 0.5
2) Dependability Layer a weight of 0.1
3) Accuracy Layer a weight of 0.2
4) EGU Layer a weight of 0.2
The Dependability Layer, Accuracy Layer and EGU Layer
all deal with evaluating the anti-malware’s technical aspects
whereas the User Layer is not directly related to the anti-
malware product per se. The statistics in reports such as [2],
[17] show that there has been an increasing trend in attackers
making use of social engineering in order to spread malware,
to execute malware or both. This is especially the case with
rogue security software also known as scare ware. Therefore
in order for an anti-malware product to be successful it must
not only address the technical aspects i.e. malware related but
also the user aspects that affect the usefulness of the product.
The prior is the reason why the User Layer has been given a
weight of 0.5 and the remaining more technical layers have
a collective weight of 0.5. Also as pointed out in [18] the
total weight for malware related categories should not exceed
50% because there are too many other things that make anti-
malware products good or bad.
The Accuracy and EGU Layers are collectively more impor-
tant than the Dependability Layer due to the fact that they are
both related to how effectively an anti-malware product will be
able to detect and / or prevent malware. Furthermore as pointed
out if such requirements are not met the user will loose faith in
the anti-malware product. Therefore the Accuracy Layer and
EGU Layer are each allocated a weight of 0.20. The remaining
weight of 0.1 is assigned to the Dependability Layer.
This concludes the discussion of our proposed evaluation
framework called ATE (Anti-malware Technique Evaluator)
that can be used to evaluate current anti-malware products but
more importantly help to better understand and / or determine
why anti-malware products are not working. The next setion
will discuss the results of an ATE evaluation.
VIII. RESULTS OF AN ATE EVALUATION
ATE has been implemented and 9 commercial anti-malware
products were evaluated. The products evaluated were: Avira
Free Antivirus, avast! Internet Security 6, ESET Smart Secu-
rity 5, AVG Anti-Virus Free Edition 2012, McAfee AntiVirus
Plus, Microsoft Security Essentials, Ad-Aware Free Internet
Security, Kaspersky Anti-Virus 2012 and Norton AntiVirus
2012. All of the anti-malware products were disabled during
the evaluation except for Norton. Furthermore the evaluation
showed that the majority of the products evaluated were
dependent on the OS and susceptible to social engineering
and human error. Due to the limited space in this paper we
can not discuss all of the results in depth nor the procedure
used to do the evaluation. It should however be noted that
the ATE evaluation procedure followed adhered to the as-
pects that the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization
(AMTSO) recommends when performing whole-product test-
ing. AMTSO is a non-profit organisation that was established
to ensure that anti-malware programs are tested objectively
[19]. Lastly in order to better understand and to visually see
the ATE evaluation process, we encourage the reader to go
to http://adam.uj.ac.za/ATE. This website contains the videos
of all of the anti-malware product ATE evaluations that we
have performed. The evaluation videos are stored under each
anti-malware product’s respective directory and are named
according to the respective layer evaluated. Alternatively if
the videos are not available at the aforementioned address,
you may contact us using the contact details on this paper to
request the original videos. The next section will discuss the
results of our User Layer.
A. User Layer Results
The User Layer results showed that four out of the nine anti-
malware products evaluated, namely Avira, AVG, Microsoft
Security Essentials and Ad-Aware all got a final layer score
of zero. The remaining anti-malware products namely: avast!,
ESET, McAfee, Kaspersky and Norton met the first require-
ment of the Susceptibility to human error i.e. to provide a
warning when a user attempts to disable a critical function of
the technique. As such they all got a final score of 12.5 out of
a possible 50. The results showed that anti-malware vendors
are not putting enough effort into reducing human error and
social engineering which lead to the spread of malicious
software. This concludes our discussion regarding the User
Layer results, the next section will discuss the Accuracy Layer
Results.
B. Accuracy Layer Results
The Accuracy layer evaluation was performed with all
updates installed for the anti-malware products and the OS
up until the 27th of November 2011. The results showed
that all of the anti-malware products were able to fulfill the
false positives requirement except for AVG. The reason AVG
failed was because it detected a Windows XP notepad.exe
file, that we obfuscated, as being malicious. None of anti-
malware products fulfilled requirement 3 as they failed to
generate a warning when we reduced their respective settings.
This once again, as in the case of the User Layer, leaves an
opportunity for human error to occur which would result in
malware spreading. However the most concerning result is that
none of the anti-malware products fulfilled the false negatives
requirement. We only went as far as finding one false negative
per anti-malware product i.e. once the false negative was found
the evaluation was stopped. The results have shown once again
that the anti-malware products are susceptible to human error.
However more importantly the results in this section have
proven that anti-malware products are not able to detect all
samples that are considered to be malicious. The next section
will discuss the EGU layer results.
C. EGU Layer Results
The evaluation of the EGU layer’s Detects Zero Day Mal-
ware component and Handles Obfuscation component were
performed with all updates installed for the anti-malware
products and the OS up until the 28th of November 2011. The
Subversion by Means of Higher Privilege Levels component
was evaluated with all updates installed for the anti-malware
products and the OS up until the 29th of November 2011.
The results showed that all the anti-malware products were
able to detect our obfuscated malware. However it should
be noted that this does not guarantee that the anti-malware
products will be able to detect all obfuscated malware. The
results also showed that Avira was the only anti-malware
product that was able to detect our Evader rootkit by making
use of a generic detection routine. Whereas no anti-malware
product was able to detect our Sabotager rootkit. All of the
anti-malware products were disabled during the evaluation
by our Evader rootkit except for Norton. Also we found
that Kaspersky blocked the installation of our Sabotager and
Evader rootkits by using a heuristic pattern based on the fact,
from what we can deduce, that our rootkits were hidden files
and were drivers being installed. Kaspersky however allowed
us to give our installer permission to install the rootkits which
once again leaves an opportunity for human error to occur.
Lastly recall that Avira was able to detect our Evader rootkit.
Therefore in order to install our rootkits and disable Avira
we had to add several exceptions into Avira for our rootkit
files. Alternatively we could have changed the extension of our
Evader and Sabotager rootkits from .SYS to something else
which would have resulted in Avira not automatically detecting
our rootkit. The next section will discuss the Dependability
Layer results.
D. Dependability Layer Results
The results of this layer are of a very high concern as only
two out of the nine anti-malware products evaluated passed the
dependability test. The two anti-malware products that passed
the test were ESET and Norton. This is of a high concern
because it means that malware can be hidden in the file system
in such a way that the other anti-malware products will not
know it’s there. This vulnerability is due to the fact the anti-
malware products are using the OS to get the list of files to
scan. The next section will look at the final scores for the
anti-malware programs.
E. Final Results
The final results showed that Norton performed significantly
better than all the other anti-malware products. This can be
attributed to its EGU layer results. On the other hand AVG
was the anti-malware product that performed the worst, which
can be attributed to AVG failing the false positive requirement
of the Accuracy layer. However it should be noted that there is
no winner or better product. The results instead show that all
anti-malware products have failed because none of them got a
score of a 100 which means they all have some vulnerability
that can be exploited by malware. Therefore we can see it as
all anti-malware products failing but some failing less than the
others. Recall that the purpose of the ATE evaluation is not
to find the best anti-malware product but instead to evaluate
each product and discover its vulnerabilities. This however
does not mean that the final results cannot be used or have
no value. The final results of several ATE evaluations can be
used to compare and / or to check if anti-malware products
are indeed improving over time. The next section will look
at the additional results which were gathered during the ATE
evaluation.
F. VirusTotal Results
In addition to our evaluation results we also scanned our
rootkits using www.virustotal.com for the first time on the
30th of November 2011. Virustotal is a service that analyses
suspicious files and URLs using several anti-malware engines.
It should be noted that VirusTotal is a free independent service.
For the first test we submitted our entire installation archive
i.e. installer and rootkits. The detection rate for the first
scan was 14.6%. For the second scan we submitted only the
Evader rootkit which resulted in a detection rate of only 2.3%.
The Avira anti-virus engine was the one that detected the
Evader rootkit. This coincides with our results from the ATE
evaluations. For the third scan we submitted our Sabotager
rootkit which was not detected as malicious by any anti-virus
engine. For the fourth scan we submitted our rootkit installer
executable which resulted in a detection rate of 14%. This was
an interesting result which lead us to create a batch file that
performs the installation of the rootkits. We then submitted
the installation batch file to VirusTotal which resulted in a 0%
detection rate. Therefore our batch file is performing the exact
same malicious activity as the executable installer but is not
being detected as malicious. The next section will provide the
conclusion and future work.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has discussed our proposed evaluation frame-
work called ATE (Anti-malware Technique Evaluator) that
can be used to evaluate current anti-malware products but
more importantly help to better understand and / or determine
why anti-malware products are not working. The framework
looks at different requirements that anti-malware products can
be measured against. An anti-malware product is evaluated
against each layer of the ATE framework. The layers consist
of components which in turn consist of requirements that an
anti-malware product should have. Should the anti-malware
product fulfill i.e. have the requirement it will be given that
requirement’s score otherwise it gets zero. The scores are
summed up and adjusted according to the component and layer
weights. A final score is then calculated for the anti-malware
product being evaluated.
The results of an ATE evaluation were also briefly dis-
cussed. All of the anti-malware programs evaluated using ATE
all had a final score of less than 50 out of 100 indicating that all
of the anti-malware programs have several vulnerabilities that
need to be addressed. The User Layer of our ATE framework
is one of the layers where most of the anti-malware products
got their lowest scores. We therefore encourage anti-malware
developers to take more responsibility in educating the home
user about malware and how to make well informed decisions
when confronted with possible malware. This can be achieved
because anti-malware companies are already exchanging mal-
ware samples with each other weekly, daily or more than
once a day essentially using live feeds [20] and such could
also exchange social engineering attack data. The other layer
where low scores were attained by the anti-malware products
was the EGU Layer. This layer demonstrated how vulnerable
an anti-malware product was against a direct attack and zero-
day malware. All of the anti-malware products evaluated were
disabled except for Norton.
The results of the Dependability layer showed that only two
out of the nine anti-malware products evaluated passed the
dependability test. This is of a high concern because it means
that malware can be hidden in the file system in such a way
that the anti-malware product will not be able to scan it. Lastly
the results of the Accuracy layer were very worrying as they
showed that none of the anti-malware products evaluated were
able to detect all of the malware samples used. This indicates
that there is a lack of collaboration between anti-malware
vendors which is most certainly due to competition between
them. If collaboration had occurred between the anti-malware
vendors then it would have been possible that all the anti-
malware products would have passed the false negative test.
Future work will be to find a better way of generating malware
variants ,so as not to rely on existing tools, and performing
more ATE evaluations in order to have a comparative analysis
of results for the same products over time. Lastly a tool will
be created to perform the evaluations automatically.
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